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Abstract 
Although the literature on university-industry links has begun to uncover the reasons for, 
and types of, collaboration between universities and businesses, it offers little explanation 
of ways to reduce the barriers in these collaborations. This paper seeks to unpack the 
nature of the obstacles to collaborations between universities and industry, exploring 
influence of different mechanisms in lowering barriers related to the orientation of 
universities and to the transactions involved in work with university partners. Drawing on 
a large-scale survey and public records, this paper explores the effects of collaboration 
experience, breadth of interaction, and inter-organizational trust on lowering different 
types of barriers. The analysis shows that prior experience of collaborative research 
lowers orientation-related barriers and that greater levels of trust reduce both types of 
barriers studied. It also indicates that breadth of interaction diminishes the orientation-
related, but increases transaction-related barriers. The paper explores the implications of 
these findings for policies aimed at facilitating university-industry collaboration.  
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Introduction 
Collaboration between industry and universities faces significant challenges including the 
fact that these organizations are driven by different incentive systems. Universities are 
primarily driven to create new knowledge and to educate, whereas private firms are 
focused on capturing valuable knowledge that can be leveraged for competitive 
advantage (Dasgupta and David, 1994). In addition, universities are becoming 
increasingly proactive managers of their collaborations with industry, seeking to create 
valuable Intellectual Property (IP) for themselves. Accordingly, more and more 
interactions between university and industry are becoming subject to measurement and 
management, leading to more formal, contractual exchanges based on codified rules and 
regulations. This is significantly altering the nature of the interactions between 
universities and industry, which in the past has relied largely on informal relations. 
Although both these aspects have been acknowledged in the literature on university-
industry (U-I) linkages, relatively few studies have investigated the nature of the barriers 
and the factors that might mitigate them (see also Hall et al., 2001). Given the central 
importance given by policy to building and supporting U-I, the lack of research the 
obstacles to it is a serious hindrance to the design of effective policy. 
In order to advance knowledge in this area, this paper examines two types of 
barriers: i) those related to differences in the orientations of industry and universities or 
what we describe as ‘orientation-related barriers’; and ii) barriers related to conflicts over 
IP, and dealing with university administration, or what we describe as ‘transaction-related 
barriers’.  This  paper  explores  the  mechanisms  can  lower  the  degree  to  which  firms 
encounter these types of barriers through an examination of three important elements that 
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influence the firm’s perception of these two obstacles to collaboration. First, we explore 
the impact of the firm’s  prior  experience of working on research projects with 
universities on the assumption that experience eases both types of barriers to 
collaboration. Second, we examine whether the nature of the interaction between the firm 
and its university partner plays a role in the perception of barriers (D'Este and Patel, 
2007). In this case, we expect that in broad collaborations the barriers will be perceived 
as less constraining. We also investigate whether the nature of the interaction – here we 
contrast education-based with contract-based forms of interaction - that firms engage in 
with university partners positively (or negatively) influences the perception of different 
types of barriers. Finally, we assess how the level of trust in its university partners shapes 
the  firm’s  perception of the barriers to working with universities (Nooteboom, 2002; 
McEvily et al., 2003). Our approach provides a window on some of the mechanisms that 
may limit the depth and quality of interaction between universities and businesses. 
The analysis is based on the statistical analysis of a large survey of UK firms that 
have collaborated on publicly funded research projects, combined with data from records 
of prior involvement in research collaboration with universities. The analysis shows that 
prior experience of collaborative research lowers orientation-related barriers and that 
greater levels of trust reduce both types of barriers studied. We also find that breadth of 
interaction diminishes the orientation-related, but increases transaction-related barriers. 
We explore the implications of these findings for research and policy. 
Bar riers to U-I collaboration 
Incentives and conflicts between public and private knowledge 
At the core of the obstacles to U-I collaborations are the different institutional norms 
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governing public and private knowledge (Dasgupta and David, 1994). The university 
system is rooted in Mertonian norms of science, such as communalism, universalism, 
disinterestedness and organized scepticism (Merton, 1973). The creation of reliable and 
public knowledge has been central to the growth of these organizations, leading to 
support from government for research to expand the pool of economically useful 
knowledge (Geuna et al., 2003). These institutional norms are fundamental to the way 
that many academics perceive and perform their work. Indeed, scientists are willing to 
accept lower wages in order to work within the institutions of science, indicating that 
many scientists are motivated by intrinsic goals as well as the social objectives of the 
universities (Stern, 2004; Cohen and Sauermann, 2007). The institutions of science 
include strong competitive mechanisms and powerful incentive regimes. The priority of 
establishing reputation through publication is critical to academic success and/or career 
sustainability. Academics often have to engage in ‘status competitions’ with their peers, 
based on publication records, institutional affiliations and prizes (Becher, 1989). Many of 
these competitions take the form of winner-takes-all, in which publishing first or winning 
the largest research grants precludes others from these same achievements or resources. 
Given this environment, much of the science system is driven by internal dynamics that 
are separate from market transactions (Polanyi, 1962; Dasgupta and David, 1994; 
Stephan, 1996). Peer esteem cannot be bought and must be created by winning favour 
and reputation among colleagues.  
Although it might be tempting to see the science system as operating outside the 
confines of market transactions, it is also true that economic and social forces outside the 
science system itself play a powerful role in shaping scientists and science (Freeman, 
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1999). Much of the research supported by government is applied, or practically-oriented, 
and focused on solving general social, technical or economic problems using the 
capabilities of science (Pavitt, 2001). Scientists often hold conflicting and evolving views 
on the benefits of working with industry (Welsh et al., 2008). Moreover, many fields of 
research, such as engineering, by their nature, involve considerable interaction with 
industrial practice (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994). In addition, the role of the university as 
an educator of professionals – doctors, engineers, accountants, lawyers, etc. – means that 
a large proportion of their staff is focused on fields of research that engage with practical 
problems. For the researchers working in such areas, practical problems provide a 
powerful stimulus to the development of new ideas (Rosenberg, 2002). However, 
although within these practical-oriented areas of research the norms of science still 
operate, they do so somewhat differently from the Mertonian ideal of science. 
Researchers in these areas are more likely to be engaged on real world problems and 
interacting with industry, and their status is likely to be co-determined by their reputation 
among their peers and their standing in industry. This is especially true in the case of 
engineering (Vincenti, 1990). 
In contrast to the relatively open nature of the science system, the process of 
knowledge creation in the private sector is dominated by attempts to appropriate the 
economic value of what firms know in order to gain competitive advantage (Teece, 
1986). This  ‘private’ knowledge is largely closed, remaining hidden within the firm or 
disclosed in a limited way through patents filed primarily for the purposes of obtaining 
temporary monopolies (Allen, 1984; Dasgupta and David, 1994). This is not to say that 
industry knowledge is completely closed: many forms of knowledge exchange and 
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leakage occur between firms working in the same sector. Many firms publish academic 
and technical papers to signal their competencies or to defend against others’ attempts to 
control particular areas of technology (Hicks, 1995; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998). 
They may also participate in open source software projects to help lower the costs of their 
own development activities (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003), and there is some 
evidence that firms engage in strategic trading of information with competitors (von 
Hippel, 1987). Despite these examples of openness, the primary motivation of  firms’ 
knowledge creation activities is the appropriation of knowledge for private gain, and 
openness to external actors is used as a strategic mechanism to gain advantage over 
competitors (Chesbrough, 2006). 
Given these two different systems of knowledge production, private firms often 
conflict with university researchers over the topic of research and timing and form of 
disclosure of research results. While researchers may be keen to disclose information to 
gain priority, firms may wish to keep secret or appropriate the information. To paraphrase 
Duguid and Brown (2000),  academics  wish  to  create  ‘leaky’  knowledge  so  that  their 
ideas will be acknowledged by their peers while firms want the knowledge to be ‘sticky’ 
so that they can control a resource that is not available to their competitors. University 
researchers are also likely to choose research topics that are perceived by their peers to be 
interesting and valuable, while firms are likely to choose topics and problems that are 
perceived as being valuable for the development of new products and services for their 
customers (Nelson, 2004). This means that the problems that each party may want to 
explore within a research project may be very different and the types of outputs may also 
diverge.  
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Conflicts over IP and university administration 
The growth over the past 30 years of universities as economic actors in their own right, 
has also been important in shaping the nature of the interaction between universities and 
firms. The rise of the university Technology Transfer Office (TTO) and the increasing 
attempts of universities to capture formal IP have had a profound impact on the nature of 
scientific efforts (Shane, 2004). These efforts have led to an expansion in university 
patenting and the creation of a new commercial focus on the part of the universities to 
create valuable IP and exploit it for financial gain (Henderson et al., 1998; Mowery and 
Ziedonis, 2002). Support designed to encourage academics to engage with industrial 
partners can take many different forms and often varies across universities and countries. 
In the UK, for example, the government has launched a range of initiatives to encourage 
universities to capture and exploit their IP (Lambert, 2003; Chapple et al., 2005). 
For some, this focus on commercialization undermines the public commons of 
science, weakening the institutions of open science through the imposition of private 
norms on public activities (Nelson, 2004). For others, the rise of the university as an 
economic actor creates a new motor of economic development that in the past has been 
rarefied and separate (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). Some scholars have attempted 
to measure the effect of engagement with industry on academic behaviour by examining 
the impact of patenting on individual  researcher’s  publication activity (Agrawal and 
Henderson, 2002; Calderini and Franzoni, 2004; Fabrizio and DiMinin, 2005; Azoulay et 
al., 2007). These studies suggest that there are complementarities between industry 
collaboration and scientific performance, and that those individuals that do the best 
research are also successful at engaging in real world problems and creating commercial 
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value (Rothaermel et al., 2007). Although these findings are not definitive and are liable 
to differ across research fields and across countries, they do suggest that academic 
engagement in commercial activities or with industry can have complementarities with 
research performance.  
Apart from these results at the individual level, we know little about the effects of 
increasing commercial-orientation in universities on general patterns of U-I collaboration. 
Evidence from the US since the Bayh-Dole Act suggests that although the level of 
university patenting has increased since the early 1980s, the quality of these patents has 
declined over time (Mowery et al., 2001). Moreover, increased university patenting 
activity began before the Bayh-Dole Act came into force and is highly localized in a few 
technological fields. The pattern is similar in Europe (Geuna and Nesta, 2006). It is 
unclear whether the changes that have occurred in university patenting activity are a 
direct consequence of technological changes or of policy. Moreover, we do not know 
what effect these efforts at commercialization have had on the nature, frequency and 
types of U-I collaboration. Early research in this area by Valentin and Jensen (2007) and 
Fabrizio (2007) suggests that the increase in university patenting has been accompanied 
by a slowdown in joint research collaborations and in the pace of private knowledge 
exploitation across a number of technological areas. This is especially the case in areas 
where there was strong reliance on public science in the past. It is also clear that in some 
cases, attempts by universities to capture the commercial benefits from research have led 
to significant conflicts and disputes between universities and their industrial partners over 
IP and/or disclosure of results (Florida, 1999; Shane and Somaya, 2007).   
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For many firms, universities are too difficult to work with, and they eschew any 
form of university collaboration. For example, in the UK, less than 5 per cent of all the 
firms that have responded to recent waves of the UK innovation survey indicate that they 
have collaborative agreements with universities (Tether and Tajar, 2008). These low 
numbers are consistent across a range of European countries (European Commission, 
2004) because the barriers we have identified have proved too great to enable successful 
collaboration. Although we know a considerable amount about the factors that lead some 
firms to collaborate or draw knowledge from universities (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 
1998; Tether, 2002; Arundel and Geuna, 2004; Laursen and Salter, 2004), we know little 
about how the barriers perceived by industry to working with universities may be 
mitigated. Our current understanding tends to rely on information from non-collaborators, 
which does not provide insights into how those firms that do collaborate with universities 
overcome these barriers (Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003; Fontana et al., 2006).  
In this paper, we focus on three potential mechanisms to reduce the obstacles to U-I 
- collaboration experience, breadth of interaction, and inter-organizational trust. These 
mechanisms build on our understanding of the factors that shape successful inter-
organizational as well as U-I collaboration. Our aim is to explore the mechanisms used to 
lower the perceived barriers to collaboration. We develop detailed arguments for each of 
these areas in the following section. 
Factors that mitigate the bar r iers to interaction 
Experience of collaboration  
Working with universities on research projects requires not only that firms learn to work 
across organizational boundaries, but also that they have or can build the capabilities to 
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collaborate with partners operating within a different incentive system. Collaborating 
with a university partner requires that firms develop operating routines and practices to 
manage this collaboration. Establishing expectations about when and in what form the 
results from a joint research project will be published may be controversial, for example. 
However, once routines and practices have been established, they are likely to be refined 
and reused in subsequent collaborations. For example, problems that emerge in one 
project can be overcome by careful planning in subsequent projects. Thus, university 
collaboration is an activity in which firms learn from experience and develop richer and 
more refined ways of engaging with the university sector.  
Not all firms are interested in this investment; they tend to fall into the categories of 
infrequent, intermittent or recurrent partners with universities (Hall et al., 2003; Hertzfeld 
et al., 2006; Bishop et al., 2008). Frequent and recurrent partners, however, are 
particularly likely to capitalize on their collaboration experience by transferring the 
information and knowledge gained through their involvement in multiple and diverse 
partnerships. Recurrent collaborators are also more likely to put in place the necessary 
routines to reconcile conflicting views on research targets (Gomes et al., 2005), 
dissemination of results (Hall et al., 2003), and timing of deliverables (Van Dierdonck 
and Debackere, 1988), among other potential sources of conflict between university and 
business partners, which should lower the barriers related to research orientation. 
Collaboration experience should also help to lower transaction-related barriers. 
Research on inter-organizational alliances shows that collaboration experience is a 
critical determinant of the success or failure of subsequent alliances (Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1994). In the case of U-I links, Hertzfeld et al. (2006) find that prior 
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collaborative experience results in standard protocols that are used as starting points for 
negotiations on IP ownership, facilitating the setting up of new collaborative agreements. 
Also, experience is instrumental in easing negotiations on the IP for new technologies 
developed during collaborative projects (Hertzfeld et al., 2006; Jelinek and Markham, 
2007). In addition, firms that have worked on many projects may have greater experience 
in negotiating IP contracts with university partners’ TTOs. They may also be more aware 
of differences in IP regimes across different universities, which may put them in a 
favourable position to negotiate with university managers compared to less experienced 
companies. In sum, research collaboration experience should help to lower transaction-
related barriers.  
Breadth of interaction channels 
Research shows that firms draw benefits from universities via rich and varied ways 
(Gibbons and Johnston, 1974; Cohen et al., 2002), from joint research collaborations to 
consultancy work, and informal interactions in meetings and at conferences. While some 
links require high levels of co-ordination and sustained interaction, offering rich 
opportunities for knowledge exchange, others are more arm’s-length and rely on 
impersonal forms of exchange, such as publications. Therefore, research that accounts for 
only one type of linkage may miss many channels relevant to firms’ drawing knowledge 
from universities and, thus, may provide only a partial understanding of the overall 
patterns of interaction. 
Involvement in a variety of channels of collaboration may contribute to better 
equip the firm to manage conflicts over the orientation of research for at least two 
reasons. First, engaging in a broad range of interaction channels creates opportunities for 
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organizational learning by exposing the firm to formalized and non-formalized 
interactions; face-to-face  and  arm’s  length  interactions;  and  short/targeted  and  long-
term/open-ended interactions. There are substantial synergies between these channels: 
while face-to-face and frequent interactions may not require a formalized-contractual 
relationship, they are crucial to improving the effectiveness of formal, long-term research 
agreements.  Second,  broad  engagement  also  contributes  to  strengthening  the  firm’s 
capacity to balance and align conflicting interests arising from the distinct system of 
incentives between academia and industry (D'Este and Patel, 2007).  
However, interactions with universities facilitated by many different channels 
may also lead to increased transactional conflicts, as many more parts of the university 
are engaged in the relationship. Each channel of interaction may engage a different part 
of the university, leading to increased levels of engagement with the university 
administration and its many rules and procedures. For example, informal relationships 
with academic faculty on education-related matters, such as student secondments, are 
likely to involve very different parts of the university administration than interactions 
with university research services departments for joint research projects. The different 
university actors (TTO, research services, departmental administrators, etc.) may have 
conflicting agendas and diverse levels of experience of working with industry. Therefore, 
interacting across different channels can entangle firms in many messy and labour 
intensive interactions with the university, which firms used to operating along a narrow 
line of interaction will find problematic. In sum, it can be expected that working across 
different channels may raise transaction-related barriers, while at the same time the 
increased breadth of interaction will lower orientation-related barriers.  
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Inter-organizational Trust  
U-I research collaboration involves high levels of uncertainty because the research 
process is beset with many unknowns. Given this, it is almost impossible to specify in 
advance the follow-on implications for the disclosure and commercialization of the 
research. Under such conditions, collaboration partners may seek to take advantage and 
act opportunistically to appropriate the benefits of the collaboration (Williamson, 1993). 
High levels of trust, on the other hand, help to reduce the fears that one of the partners 
will act opportunistically (Bradbach and Eccles, 1989).  Here,  trust  is  defined  as  “the 
expectation that a partner 1) can be relied on to fulfil obligations; 2) will behave in a 
predictable manner; and 3) will act and negotiate fairly when the possibility for 
opportunisms is present” (Zaheer et al., 1998: 142). Trust allows the partners involved in 
the exchange to be confident that their collaborator will treat them fairly and in a 
consistent way, and will help to resolve any problems that may arise jointly. Therefore, 
trust may help to lower perceived barriers to collaboration.     
Moreover, in order to render the research collaboration effective, firms and 
universities will have to share knowledge and information. This knowledge and 
information may be proprietary and tacit, which makes its exchange difficult. If a 
collaboration is characterized by low levels of trust, partners are less likely to be 
forthcoming about the knowledge and information required to make the collaboration 
successful (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Thus, higher trust between partners stimulates rich 
social and information exchanges and encourages partners to exchange more and 
valuable knowledge and information (Ring and Van de ven, 1992). Moreover, trust-based 
relationships facilitate the exchange of difficult to codify knowledge and information, 
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which is by definition difficult to communicate and to trade in markets (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). Trust expresses the capacity of firm and university to work together to 
resolve problems, and demonstrates a willingness to understand and adjust behaviours to 
align with the needs and expectations of partners (McEvily et al., 2003). For these 
reasons, it can be expected that high levels of trust will be associated with lower 
orientation-related and transaction-related barriers. 
Data, method and empirical approach 
Since our study is designed to capture industry attitudes to collaboration, we conducted a 
survey of firms that have collaborated with universities. To construct the sampling frame 
for our study, we drew on the records of research projects funded by the Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council (ESPRC). The EPSRC is the UK’s largest funding 
council, providing over £700 million each year to university researchers to conduct new 
research. The remit of the ESPRC is broad and includes areas of the engineering and 
physical sciences, including engineering disciplines, mathematics, chemistry and physics. 
Thus, our study includes a broad range of scientific areas and neutralizes the strong life-
sciences bias that pervades much of the literature on U-I links. In order to ensure 
complete records, we surveyed all the private, for-profit organizations with formal 
involvement in EPSRC collaborative projects between 1999-2006. After cleaning the 
records for duplicates, we obtained a sample of 3,119 different organizations. The survey 
was addressed the person responsible for the university collaboration within the 
organization. In addition, to ensure that our individual level responses were 
representative of views of their wider organization, we included a top up sample of 312 
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individuals that were listed as the second contact name on the collaboration. This 
approach left us with a final sample of 3,431 individuals.    
The sampling method in our study does not allow us to explain why firms 
collaborate with universities, which is a topic that has been extensively covered in prior 
research. Instead, we offer evidence on firms’ perceptions of the barriers to collaboration 
among those that have engaged in cooperation with universities. This allows us to 
provide information based on actual experience of collaboration rather than the 
perceptions of non-collaborating firms, which inevitably reflect general attitudes to 
universities rather than real experience of university collaboration.  
The unit of analysis for our survey is the business unit which we defined as “an 
organizational unit producing goods or services which benefits from a degree of 
autonomy  in  decision  making,  especially  for  the  allocation  of  its  resources”. This 
definition is consistent with the UK innovation surveys (Stockdale, 2002). We decided to 
focus on the business unit because some of the firms in our sample are large, multi-site 
organizations. As U-I collaboration is often local in character, collaboration between 
business units and universities is likely to be decided locally rather than centrally 
(Cantwell, 1989; Criscuolo, 2005). Our analysis also distinguishes between subsidiaries 
and independent organizations.  
In past studies, scholars have tended to focus on projects rather than business units 
when assessing the nature of the barriers to collaboration (Hall et al., 2001). Our choice 
to focus on the business unit is also because many of the organizations in our sample are 
involved in more than one project. For example, more than ten organizations in our 
sample have had involvement in more than 40 different research projects. Although 
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focusing on project-level interactions can uncover important issues arising from 
exchanges within a project, the limitation is that it captures information on only one 
among what may be a portfolio of projects. The barriers that emerge in one project may 
have been resolved in another project, even with the same university and industry 
partners. Also, focusing on a single research project can obscure the different 
relationships likely to be in place between the firm and its university partners, such as 
student training or contract research, and how these broad forms of interaction shape the 
nature of the barriers faced by firms in their engagement with universities in general. By 
capturing information at the level of the business unit, we go beyond the confines of a 
single project and explore the more general pattern of relations between the firm and its 
university partners. 
To develop the survey questionnaire, we conducted a number of interviews with 
industry and with academics as well as reviewing the literature. The survey asked about 
the barriers to interacting with universities and the frequency of interaction by types of 
engagement (Cohen et al., 2002). Responses were based on an extensive list of barriers 
and types of engagement, described below. Factual questions, such as number of times 
the firm engaged in different channels of interaction, referred to the period 2005-2006. 
The survey also included a series of questions on respondents’ organizations: size, sector, 
R&D expenditure, share of staff with higher education degrees, and ownership. 
Data collection was done in several stages. First, in November 2007, we wrote to 
3,431 individuals in our sample with an invitation to the individual to go to a website to 
complete an electronic version of the survey. The invitation included a letter from 
Professor David Delpy, Chief Executive of the EPSRC, endorsing the study. This first 
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stage elicited 276 responses. To improve the response rate, we telephoned non-
respondents to encourage them to respond. This yielded another 176 responses. In the 
second stage and again to improve the response rate, we conducted another postal survey 
in February 2008, this time including a paper copy of the questionnaire in order that 
respondents had the choice of an electronic or paper-based version. This second stage 
yielded another 188 responses. In the third stage, we used the email addresses collected 
from the telephone contacts with organizations to send email reminders to non-
respondents for whom we had email addresses. This yielded another 13 responses giving 
us a total of 646 usable responses, representing 602 organizations (44 responses were 
from individuals in the same firm and were excluded). Based on a total survey population 
of 3,431, the response rate was just under 20 per cent. After removing questionnaires 
with incomplete information, or from individuals in the same organization (we took the 
average scores for these), we were left with a sample 503 organizations for analysis. The 
sample covers a diverse range of firms, with representation from organizations of 
different sizes, across all sectors, including professional services.  
To check the reliability of our sample, we conducted a number of tests on the 
respondent population. First, we compared early and late respondents: we found no 
significant differences in terms of structural features, such as size, sector or R&D 
intensity or attitudes to collaboration (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). Second, we 
compared the responses from two or more respondents form the same organization and 
we found that individual responses were highly correlated. This indicates that the 
responses reflect general organizational practice rather than individual attitudes. Finally, 
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we compared between electronic and paper-based responses to the survey and found no 
significant differences. These tests increase confidence that the survey data are reliable. 
Measures 
Dependent variable 
As discussed above, barriers to U-I collaboration are based on: 1) differences in 
incentives and orientation (orientation-related barriers); and 2) conflicts over IP and 
university administration procedures (transaction-related barriers). To capture the extent 
to which firms indicated that they faced orientation- and transaction-related barriers in 
working with universities, we drew on the responses to a question about the general 
barriers to interaction with universities. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of 
agreement with 12 statements concerning some likely barriers to interaction with 
universities. The items were developed based on interviews with industry organizations 
and the literature on barriers to knowledge exchange between universities and industry.  
To construct our measure of orientation-related barriers, we focused on the three 
items directly related to the orientation of university research and researchers. These are: 
university research is extremely orientated towards pure science; long term orientation of 
university research (concerns over lower sense of urgency of university researchers 
compared to industry researchers); and mutual lack of understanding about expectations 
and working practices. Each item is measured on a five point likert scale from ‘strongly 
agree’ to ‘do not agree at all’ and is coded 1 if respondents indicate that they ‘agree’ or 
‘strongly  agree’  with  the  statement,  and  0  otherwise.  To  calculate  the  variable 
orientation-related barriers, we added these scores so that each organizations scored 0 
  19 
for no barriers and a score of 3 when all orientation-related barriers are perceived as 
high.1   
The second type of barrier is related to conflicts over IP with the TTO, and 
negotiation with university administrations or what we term transaction-related barriers. 
Previous research shows that there are often conflicts between industry and universities 
over IP ownership (Shane and Somaya, 2007) and also that universities may have 
unrealistic expectations about the commercial potential of university research (Clarysse et 
al., 2007), which can result in their overvaluing its IP. These types of conflicts with TTOs 
and university administration may put a significant strain on collaborations, eventually 
deterring firms from collaborating with university. The measurement of transaction-
related barriers includes the following four items from the question on barriers: industrial 
liaison offices tend to oversell research or have unrealistic expectations; potential 
conflicts with university regarding royalty payments from patents or other intellectual 
property rights and concerns about confidentiality; rules and regulations imposed by 
universities or government funding agencies; and absence or low profile of industrial 
liaison offices in the university (which was reverse coded). Our transaction-related 
barriers measure was created using the method described for orientation-related barriers.2 
Explanatory variables 
We measured collaboration experience as the total length (in months and in log scale) of 
research experience of working on collaborative projects with universities, funded by the 
                                                        1 As alternative measures, we used average and aggregate scores for both dependent variables. The results 
from this analysis are consistent with those reported below. 2 In order to apply fractional response regression (see below), we normalize the variable by dividing by the 
highest barriers perceived, so that the resulting variable takes a minimum value of 0 and a maximum of 1. 
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EPSRC, that the organization had accumulated in the period 1991-2004.3 This measure 
offers a composite measure of experience, taking into account that firms may be involved 
in more than one project and that these projects may span different universities and 
different periods. The approach offers a more fine-grained operationalization than just 
taking numbers of years the organization has collaborated with universities or total 
number of projects.  
In order to capture the breadth of interaction between businesses and universities, 
we created a variable measuring the extent to which organizations use different types of 
interactions with universities during the period 2005–2006. This information was taken 
from the survey question on channels of interaction between firm and university. 
Building on D’Este and Patel (2007), we examined the broad range of channels through 
which organizations can interact with universities. We focus on joint research projects, 
contract research, consultancy, training of firm employees; postgraduate training in the 
company; recruitment of recent graduates or postgraduates; and student placements. To 
construct the variable, we used a binary code for each channel of interaction, which takes 
the value of 1 if the firm reports having used a given interaction channel, and 0 otherwise. 
We then simply added up the seven interaction channels to represent the breadth of 
interaction.  
Since the nature of industry-university interactions may have a distinctive effect on 
the barriers, we also considered two other measures for breadth of interactions: a variable 
that captures more informal interactions related to the educational role of universities, 
including the items ‘training of firm employees’, ‘postgraduate training in the company’,                                                         3 We took account of records up to 2004 in order to avoid an overlap with the time frame of the 
questionnaire, which asks firms to report information for the period 2005-2006. 
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‘recruitment of recent graduates or postgraduates’ and ‘student placements’. We term this 
variable education-based interaction. We created another variable to capture more formal 
interactions between industry and universities through contractual relationships, 
including the items ‘joint research projects’, ‘contract research’, and ‘consultancy’.  We 
call this variable contract-based interaction. 
Building on Zaheer et al.’s (1998) inter-organizational trust scale, we measured 
level of trust through four statements measured on a five-point likert scale. The items 
include: our university partners may use opportunities that arise to profit at our expense 
(reverse coded); based on past experience, we cannot have complete confidence in our 
university partners to keep promises made to us (reverse coded); we trust our university 
partners to treat us fairly; and we trust that confidential/proprietary information shared 
with our university partners will be kept strictly confidential. As might be expected for 
such a well-established scale, the Cronbach Alpha was high at .83. 
Control variables 
We also included several other variables that may have an influence on the level of 
barriers that firms face when interacting with universities. First, we control for 
organization’s  level  of  absorptive  capacity.  There  are  several  proxies in the literature 
used to measure absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2006). 
Drawing on Rothwell and Dodgson (1991) and Schmidt (2005), we measure level of 
absorptive capacity as the percentage of staff with a higher education degree. We chose 
not to adopt one of the most common operationalizations of absorptive capacity - R&D 
intensity - because of the high number of service firms (over 35%) in our sample. R&D 
intensity may underestimate the absorptive capacity of service firms because these firms 
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typically have modest R&D budgets or do not conduct formal R&D, but they may have 
high levels of absorptive capacity. The variable is categorical and ranges from 1 to 5: 1 = 
percentage of higher education staff equal to or less than 10%; 2 = percentage of higher 
education staff between 11% and 20%; 3 = percentage of higher education staff between 
21% and 40%; 4 = percentage of higher education staff between 41% and 60%; and 5 = 
percentage of higher education staff between 61% and 100%. We used a categorical 
approach because we wanted to reduce the burden for respondents.4  
Second, we include a measure for firm size, i.e. the logarithm of the number of 
employees, expressed in full-time equivalents, as a control variable; large firms are likely 
to have more resources to work with external organizations such as universities (Tether, 
2002; Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003).  Third,  we  control  for  the  nature  of  the  firm’s 
organizational structure. This dummy variable identifies firms that are independent rather 
being part of a large group. We would expect organizations that belong to a group to have 
more resources for and more experience of working with universities and, therefore, to 
face lower barriers to collaborations. Fourth, since we rely on individuals to report 
information for the organization, it is important to account for differences among these 
individuals in terms of their educational backgrounds. Individuals with doctoral degrees 
are likely to be more familiar with university norms compared to individuals with only 
undergraduate degrees. We wanted to ensure that our results were not biased by the fact 
that surveys were addressed to named research collaborators, which might have increased 
the tendency for respondents to respond more positively to questions about barriers to 
universities than individuals not directly involved in the research. In order to control for                                                         
4 We also conducted an additional analysis where we substituted R&D intensity for percentage of staff with 
higher education degrees. Again, the results were consistent, suggesting our main results did not change 
according to the control used for absorptive capacity. 
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this, we include a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent has a doctoral degree 
and 0 otherwise. Finally, we also include eight dummy variables to account for inter-
industry differences in patterns of U-I interaction.    
Method of estimation  
Our dependent variable (total barriers) takes on non-negative integer values and therefore 
is a count variable. A commonly used method of estimation is the Poisson regression 
model (or negative binomial regression in the case of overdispersion). However, since 
our dependent variable is restricted by an upper bound (i.e. the maximum number of 
barriers is four), Poisson or Negative Binomial distributions are not strictly applicable. 
An alternative approach is an ordered logistic model; however, this would imply a natural 
ordering in the level of barriers, which may not apply. Instead, we build on a technique 
provided by Wooldridge (2002: 661), who suggests that a dependent variable may be 
“obtained by dividing a count variable by an upper bound”, and that such an approach 
allows the application of fractional logit regression (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). This 
approach, models E(y | x) as a logistic function, where y is the dependent variable and x is 
a set of regressors: E(y | x) = exp(x)/[1 + exp(x)]. This model ensures that the predicted 
values of y are in (0, 1) and that the effect of any xj on E(y | x) diminishes as x  . The 
method is non-linear and can be estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood, and partial 
effects may be  “evaluated  at  the jˆ  and interesting values of x”. (Wooldridge, 2002: 
662).  
Results 
To understand the nature of university barriers to collaboration, we first explore the 
different obstacles that organizations face. Table 1 lists the seven barriers to university 
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interaction and the percentage of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and large 
firms that indicated agreement with the different statements on these barriers to 
interaction with universities.5 Overall, we find that differences between SMEs and large 
companies are relatively small, with both types of firms indicating that orientation-related 
barriers are lower than transaction-related one. As might be expected, SMEs perceive the 
barriers related to the long-term orientation of universities and to the rules and 
regulations imposed by universities or government funding agencies as higher than larger 
firms.  
-- Insert Table 1 here -- 
Table 2 presents the differences in orientation-related barriers across industry and 
the variation between sectors on the importance of different barriers. We find that 
orientation-related barriers are highest in the machinery and metals, transport, and 
utilities and construction industries, while firms in chemical-related industries have the 
lowest proportion of firms reporting a high number of orientation-related barriers. Again, 
this might be expected given that the chemical-related industries include many science-
based firms, for example pharmaceuticals firms.  
-- Insert Table 2 here -- 
Table 3 presents the differences in terms of transaction-related barriers across 
different industries. The table shows that firms operating in the chemical and transport 
industries report the highest number of transaction-related barriers while those in utilities 
and construction have the lowest proportion of firms reporting a high number of 
transaction-related barriers. Thus, we can see that for firms in the transport industry both                                                         5 Following the EU definition, SMEs are organizations that are autonomous, that employ less than 250 
people, and whose annual turnover does not exceed €50 million or whose annual balance sheet total does 
not exceed €43 million.  
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orientation-related and transaction-related barriers are high. Also, firms active in utilities 
and construction face high orientation-related barriers, but low transaction-related 
barriers. The high levels of the barriers in these industries may be result of lower levels of 
scientific activity in these sectors and thus fewer capabilities to collaborate with 
universities. 
-- Insert Table 3 here -- 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the independent 
variables in the model. Overall, the level of correlation between the main variables is 
low, suggesting that multicollinarity is not a concern. 
-- Insert Table 4 here -- 
In the first stage of analysis (Models 1a and 1b - Table 5), we enter only the control 
variables. It can be seen that absorptive capacity (percentage of higher educated staff) is 
negatively associated with orientation-related barriers. Further, larger firms perceive 
higher transaction-related barriers, and individuals with doctoral degrees are more 
inclined to perceive higher transaction-related barriers to interactions with universities.  
-- Insert Table 5 here -- 
In Models 2a and 2b, we introduce our key explanatory variables. First, we 
suggested that organizations with more collaboration experience will perceive fewer 
barriers than their less experienced counterparts. The coefficient of prior collaboration 
experience is negatively associated with barriers related to differences in orientation (-
.05; p ≤ .01), but not to barriers related to transactions-related conflicts. This suggests that 
routines learnt through conducting joint research with universities, lower the barriers 
related to the long-term nature of university research, helping to overcome differences 
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between the partners on time horizon. However, experience of working with universities 
does not lower the perceived barriers related to university administrative procedures and 
conflicts over IP. Therefore, experience plays only a partial role in mitigating the barriers 
to U-I collaboration. To complement, these results we undertook several more analyses 
exploring different measures of experience, such as number of projects, number of 
university partners and research project size. The results (which are not shown for 
reasons of space) are consistent with those reported above.  
Next, we suggested that breadth of interaction is likely to be associated with lower 
orientation- and transaction-related barriers. The results show an interesting swing in the 
relationship between breadth of interaction and orientation-related and transaction-related 
barriers, respectively: while the coefficient is significant and negative in the case of 
orientation-related barriers (-.06;  p  ≤  .01),  it  is  significant  and  positive  for  transaction-
related barriers (.12; p ≤ .001). These findings cast light on how broader U-I ties can have 
both a positive and a negative effect on the barriers to collaboration. The fact that breadth 
of engagement is negatively associated to orientation-related barriers suggests that 
collaboration involving multiple channels allows firms to cope better with the problems 
associated with divergent priorities and time horizons in the research. It also indicates 
firms’  willingness  to  invest  across  many  areas  of  engagement  enables  the  building  of 
routines for long-term and mutually beneficial exchanges. However, working with 
universities involving many different channels is also likely to involve negotiation with 
more university actors, including different administrative departments and possibly the 
TTO. As a result, broad patterns of engagement might mean involvement in numerous 
and lengthy interactions with university administrators, who are likely to be highly risk 
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averse and may be responding to differing agendas and mandates. Thus, broad 
engagement may raise greater transaction-related barriers to collaboration.  
Finally, as expected, the coefficient of inter-organizational trust is negative and 
significant in Models 2a (-.75, p ≤ .001) and 2b (-.37, p ≤ .001), indicating that high trust 
in university partners is associated with lower barriers. It is interesting that trust reduces 
both orientation-related and transaction-related barriers. This may be because trust relies 
on strong bonds of mutual understanding and adjustment and, therefore, helps firms to 
manage their different expectations of the research and to lower the considerable 
transaction costs of working with university partners. 
Table 6 presents the results for influence of education-based and contract-based 
interactions on orientation-related barriers and transaction-related barriers respectively. 
There is a strong negative association between education-based interactions and 
orientation-related barriers (-.08, p ≤ .01), but not contract-based interactions (-.03). Also, 
we find that both types of interaction have a strong positive influence on the number of 
transaction-related barriers: .11, p ≤ .05 for education-based interactions and .13, p ≤ .001 
for contract-based interactions. The effects of the other explanatory and control variables 
do not change. These results show that those interactions that involve informal and 
frequent face-to-face contacts contribute significantly to attenuating the orientation-
related barriers, while broader interactions (both education and contract-based) increase 
the extent of transaction-related barriers. These findings support the above results 
suggesting that the differential effect of breadth of interactions on perceived barriers 
increases transaction-related barriers but lowers orientation-related barriers. These 
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findings highlight the importance of education-based interactions for breaking down 
orientation-barriers.   
-- Insert Table 6 here -- 
Conclusions and implications 
Although it there has been recognition that there are substantial barriers to successful 
collaboration and knowledge exchange between universities and firms, few studies have 
attempted to measure and map these perceived barriers or investigate what may attenuate 
them. From our analysis it is clear that many types of barriers plague collaboration 
between industry and universities - from orientation of the university and its researchers, 
to attitudes and behavior of university administration and the TTO. Although the ‘classic’ 
barrier to U-I collaboration – the university’s long-term orientation – remains substantial, 
other factors are important in constraining collaboration, especially those related to IP 
and administrative procedures. 
Some authors argue that IP-related barriers have become more prevalent in U-I 
interactions as a consequence of policies designed to encourage universities to increase 
the commercialization of research and to adopt a more aggressive strategy towards 
negotiations over IP (Siegel et al., 2003; Hertzfeld et al., 2006). While our study does not 
address these aspects directly, it does show that transaction-related barriers are much 
more difficult to mitigate than orientation-related barriers. In particular, while 
collaboration experience and breadth of interactions equip firms to handle (and 
potentially overcome) barriers related to conflicts of interest in research priorities, they 
do not help firms to handle IP-related barriers. In this respect, we show that transaction-
related barriers are particularly sensitive to government policy and higher education 
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governance. For instance, changes in the system of governance of U-I collaboration in the 
UK to favour the involvement of an increasing number of parties both within the 
university (e.g. university research contracts office, TTO, the department) and the firm 
(e.g. the IP office, research labs and firm headquarters). This trend is likely to exacerbate 
IP-related barriers since multiple collaborations can increase both the costs and time 
required to build new collaborations. At the same time, older and more informal systems 
of exchange and collaboration are coming under increasing scrutiny from university 
administrators. Such efforts to bring exchanges and interaction ‘in from the cold’ could 
have the effect of raising transaction-related barriers, especially if these efforts are 
organized around the requirements of central university rules and regulations. Thus, 
increasing attention to the management of U-I links through government policy efforts 
and university administration could increase the barriers to such interactions. It would be 
unfortunate if the efforts to manage (and potentially support) these interactions results in 
increasing the barriers. The challenge for policy, then, is to find straightforward, simple 
mechanisms for management and monitoring of U-I interactions. Achieving this will 
require attention to the costs and benefits of management and monitoring efforts, and the 
weighing of the value of monitoring against negatively perceived intrusion. 
An important finding from this study is that inter-organization trust is one of the 
strongest mechanisms for lowering the barriers to interaction between universities and 
industry. It suggests that the traditional system of informal reciprocity and exchange, 
which dominated U-I exchanges in the postwar era, should be an important part of 
attempts to support and build U-I collaborations. Building trust between academics and 
industrial practitioners requires long-term investment in interactions, based on mutual 
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understanding about different incentive systems and goals. It also necessitates a focus on 
face-to-face contacts between industry and academia, initiated through personal referrals 
and sustained by repeated interactions, involving a wide range of interaction channels and 
overlapping personal and professional relationships.  
Future research and limitations  
Understanding the perceived barriers to U-I collaboration is important because it 
uncovers the problems and challenges that have emerge in the U-I collaboration process. 
Much of the research on U-I links relies on secondary information on the problems and 
challenges involved in collaboration and very little on information from firms actually 
involved in these collaborations. The present study looks at the mechanisms that may 
mitigate the barriers to U-I collaboration, and may help to set in place programmes that 
will alleviate the problems before they undermine what might be rewarding sets of 
collaborations. 
Our study focuses on one period, which makes it difficult to draw inferences about 
the direction of causality. Future research should explore the barriers over time, and 
examine the factors that lower or raise the barriers to collaboration. It may be that policy 
interventions, such as new university IP policies or changes in university funding 
regimes, will have a significant impact on the perceived barriers. Currently, we do not 
have the appropriate data to map the barriers to collaboration over time. Relying on 
secondary sources, such as patents or academic citations, may obscure important 
institutional changes within the collaboration process itself. New and careful efforts are 
required to monitor the health of U-I collaboration and should include study of 
collaboration across different areas of research, as opposed to a focus on only the life 
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sciences where patterns of collaboration may be more easily monitored through 
established indicators.   
Future research should also examine the impact of barriers on the outcomes of 
collaboration. Although it is assumed that these barriers hinder effective knowledge 
exchange, we do not have evidence on how the perceived barriers shape subsequent 
collaborations. For example, it would be useful to know whether a bad experience of 
university collaboration deters the firm from future collaboration with a university. In this 
paper, we focused on a sample of firms that had been involved in formal research 
projects, but many firms never get this far in their interactions with universities. For most 
firms, U-I interaction involves a long process of learning through small steps, such as 
enabling student placements through to more extensive engagement. We know little 
about  firms’  progression  from  informal,  infrequent  interactions  to long-term, sustained 
collaboration with universities. An understanding of this progress may offer the greatest 
potential for effective policy measures to support U-I collaboration. 
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Tables and F igures  
Table 1: Type of bar r iers to university interaction for SM Es and large fi rms  
(% of firms that indicated that they agree or strongly agree with the item in the questionnaire) 
  SME Large 
firms 
Type Barrier % % 
Orientation-related 
barriers 
University research is extremely orientated towards 
pure science  
31 36 
Long term orientation of university research (concerns 
over lower sense of urgency of university researchers 
compared to industry researchers), 
69 59 
Mutual lack of understanding about expectations and 
working practices 
34 34 
Transaction-related 
barriers 
Industrial liaison offices tend to oversell research or 
have unrealistic expectations,  
50 49 
Potential conflicts with university regarding royalty 
payments from patents or other intellectual property 
rights and concerns about confidentiality, 
57 54 
Rules and regulations imposed by universities or 
government funding agencies, 
58 53 
Absence or low profile of industrial liaison offices in 
the university (reverse coded) 
27 24 
 
 
Table 2: Number of or ientation-related bar r iers to university interaction, by sector 
  
Number of 
fi rms 
Number of O rientation-related barriers 
 (% of fi rms) 
Industrial sector  0 1  2 3 
Chemical 37 11 41 41 8 
Chemical-related 23 26 43 30 0 
Machinery and Metal 53 8 36 43 13 
Electronics and Instruments 70 27 29 31 13 
Transport 15 27 7 47 20 
Utilities and Construction 46 22 26 33 20 
Business services 182 27 32 31 9 
Other 77 29 26 31 14 
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Table 3: Number of transaction-related bar r iers to university interaction, by sector 
  
Number of 
fi rms 
Number of T ransaction-related barriers 
 (% of fi rms) 
Industrial sector  0 1  2 3 4 
Chemical 37 5 19 30 30 16 
Chemical-related 23 9 26 35 30 0 
Machinery and Metal 53 17 21 32 25 6 
Electronics and Instruments 70 10 19 34 29 9 
Transport 15 0 47 13 27 13 
Utilities and Construction 46 24 43 13 20 0 
Business services 182 12 25 36 22 5 
Other 77 17 29 29 17 9 
 
Table 4. Descr iptive statistics and cor relation matr ix of independent variables  
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Orientation-related 
barriers 
1.33 .96 0 3           
2. Transaction-related 
barriers 
1.84 1.12 0 4 .21          
3. Collab. Experiencea 157.60 491.67 0 8869.8 -.06 .01         
4. Breadth of interaction 3.64 2.04 0 7 -.03 .18 .15        
5. Education-based 
interaction 
2.13 1.40 0 4 .05 .13 .15 .89       
6. Contract-based 
interaction 
1.51 1.03 0 3 .00 .17 .09 .78 .40      
7. Inter-organizational 
Trust 
3.65 .63 1.25 5 -.31 -.21 .03 -.04 -.02 -.06     
8. Absorptive capacity 3.46 1.54 1 5 -.10 .07 -.09 .06 .03 .08 -.03    
9. Size 4.46 2.33 0 11.51 -.01 -.03 .25 .52 .49 .37 .09 -.28   
10. Independent .53 .50 0 1 .00 .02 -.18 -.27 -.26 -.19 -.15 .10 .44  
11. Doctoral .48 .50 0 1 -.00 .20 .03 .25 .19 .23 -.01 .16 .09 .07 
Note: Coefficients with an absolute value above .09 are significant at the .05 level, two-tailed. Industry dummies are not reported. aFor prior collaboration 
experience, natural logarithm is used in correlations and analysis but actual values are reported in descriptive statistics 
 
Table 5. Fractional logit regression estimates of orientation­related and transaction­
related barriers to interaction 
  Orientation­related 
barriers 
Transaction­related barriers 
  Model 1a  Model 2a  Model 1b  Model 2b 
Control variables         
Absorptive capacity  ­.08*  ­.07**  .03  .01 
Size  ­.03  .01  ­.02  ­.08*** 
Independent  .02  ­.13+  .02  ­.00 
Doctoral  .08  .13  .42***  .35*** 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Explanatory variables         
Collaboration experience    ­.05**    .00 
Breadth of interaction    ­.06**    .12*** 
Inter­organizational trust    ­.75***    ­.37*** 
         
Log pseudolikelihood  ­133.20  ­101.11  ­52.58  ­32.60 
df (residual)  491  488  491  488 
No observations  503  503  503  503 
*** p ≤ .001,  ** p ≤ .01,  * p ≤ .05, + p ≤ .10; one­tailed. Standardized coefficients are 
reported. Standard errors are in parentheses 
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Table 6. Fractional logit regression estimates of orientation­related and transaction­
related  barriers  to  interaction  involving  education­based  and  contract­based 
interaction 
  Orientation­related 
barriers 
Transaction­related  
barriers 
  Model 3a  Model 4a  Model 5a  Model 3b  Model 4b  Model 5b 
Control variables             
Absorptive capacity  ­.08***  ­.08**  ­.07**  .02  .02  .01 
Size  ­.01  ­.01  .01  ­.06**  ­.05***  ­.08*** 
Independent  ­.13+  ­.12+  ­.13+  ­.01  ­.02  ­.00 
Doctoral  .13  .11  .13  .38***  .37***  .35*** 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Explanatory variables             
Collaboration experience  ­.05**  ­.05**  ­.05**  .00  .00  .00 
Education­based 
interaction   
­.09**    ­.08**  .13**    .11* 
Contract­based interaction    ­.05  ­.03    .16***  .13*** 
Inter­organizational trust  ­.74***  ­.73***  ­.74***  ­.39***  ­.38***  ­.37*** 
             
Log pseudolikelihood  ­101.01  ­102.27  ­100.92  ­35.20  ­35.63  ­32.58 
df (residual)  488  488  487  488  488  487 
No observations  503  503  503  503  503  503 
*** p ≤ .001,  ** p ≤ .01,  * p ≤ .05, + p ≤ .10; one­tailed. Standardized coefficients are 
reported.  Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses. 
 
